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Abstract
Demand for eﬀective network defense capabilities continues to increase as cyber
attacks occur more and more frequently and gain more and more prominence in the
media. Current security practices stop after data encryption and network address filtering.
Security at the lowest level of network infrastructure allows for greater control of how the
network traﬃc flows around the network. This research details two methods for extending
security practices to the physical layer of a network by modifying the network
infrastructure. The first method adapts the Advanced Encryption Standard while the
second method uses a Steiner tree. After the network connections are updated, the traﬃc
is re-routed using an approximation algorithm to solve the resulting multicommodity flow
problem. The results show that modifying the network connections provides additional
security to the information. Additionally, this research extends on previous research by
addressing enterprise-size networks; networks between 5 and 1000 nodes with 1 through 5
interfaces are tested. While the final configuration depends greatly on the starting network
infrastructure, the speed of the execution time enables administrators to make
infrastructure adjustments in response to active cyber attacks.
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Dynamic Network Topologies
1 Introduction
1.1 Premise
A network is a collection of devices, known as nodes, which exchange information
over a means of communication, known as edges. Network devices are workstations,
servers, routers, switches, and other network equipment. Edges are cables, radio waves,
satellite links, or other methods of transmission. While much information exchanged over
a network may be free and open to access (e.g. public web pages such as Wikipedia),
some information (e.g. private communications or financial transactions) must be
protected and limited to access. In the case of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
Intelligence Community (IC), networks contain information that is pertinent to national
security. To protect this information, the network must also be protected.
Network defense consists of a series of mechanisms designed to protect information
traveling through a network from any potential adversary that desires that information.
The defense is multi-layered, depending both on application and transmission methods.
Commonly, applications employ their own set of hardening techniques. A common
technique is encryption, which is used to mask the actual content. At the network level,
firewalls and various protocols, such as IPSec, can automatically reject data outright based
on Internet Protocol (IP) address or port number. Still, at the lowest level, data must flow
between devices over the network for the network to be of any use. More importantly, a
valid data flow path from source to destination must be known for data to be properly
received. This data flow across a network establishes the basic topology of the network,
creating a virtual landscape that can be scanned and probed for vulnerabilities.
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A network topology is the mapping of the interconnections between network nodes.
Typically, enterprise networks are designed to have a certain topology which rarely
changes. Updates and changes are generally time-consuming, costly, and must be
executed in a precisely controlled fashion to avoid impacting network functionality. Other
networks are much more flexible but can be much less reliable, depending on the
transmission medium. The goal of this research is to allow changes at the base level of the
network without incurring large costs and without adversely eﬀecting network
functionality. Most networks employed in commercial and government applications are
statically defined. Data flows from device A to device B over a given static route Z. Once
these networks are successfully scanned, an attacker can move to the act of actual
exploitation on the assumption that the topology and traﬃc patterns will not change. The
network is then infiltrated and information compromised.
An important key point is that a network topology, though physically stable, is also
virtual. It is a landscape that can be changed at will by activating or deactivating network
edges. Assuming that network traﬃc is properly re-routed to accommodate those changes,
the nodes continue to operate as if no changes had occurred. Essentially, modifying the
network topology on a regular basis provides an additional layer of defense for the
network without compromising mission capabilities. Regular topology shifts force
attackers to expend resources just to scan and re-scan the network, thus lessening the
probability or severity of an attack. Such topology shifts can also accompany Intrusion
Protection Systems (IPS) to automatically respond to an active attack.
1.2 Goals
Before any network topology changes can take place, the changes must be known.
Possible changes range from simple re-routing of a traﬃc path to physically disabling a
connection. A new network topology must be generated and routes for network traﬃc
re-established. The generation process must occur quickly enough to react to dynamic
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network conditions, with or without human administrative assistance, at an enterprise
level. If generating a new network topology takes days or even hours, the output is
obsolete on arrival.
The new topology must not partition the existing network into multiple networks or
fail to re-route any network traﬃc. Any inability to contact other users or use a network
service renders the topology useless. Topology generation must also consider operational
network costs and restraints: operation cannot consume excessive resources or use edges
that do not exist. A new topology must also consider the configuration of previous
generations because the entire goal of the process is to substantially modify the network
topology; consistent re-use of a network link or a route simply misses the point. Similarly,
if a solution only trivially changes the network topology as compared to previous
generations, that solution should be rejected.
A final consideration is the security of the entire generation process: an attacker
should be forced to re-scan a network to re-identify targets. If an attacker can perform the
same calculations and arrive at the same solution, the process will quickly be reverse
engineered and defeated. Given that an attacker can observe both the previous and current
configurations, the generation process must execute with additional information.
The goal of this research, then, is to create a dynamic network topology generation
and verification process. Implementation and testing of the output of the process on a
physical network is beyond the scope of this thesis. Previous research in this area
considered many of the factors discussed above, but to be truly useful all factors must be
evaluated [1]. This research is faster and able to consider larger networks than previous
research while maintaining significant confidence that the described constraints are
accounted for appropriately. Additionally, this research provides flexibility to network
administrators by incorporating flexible tolerance levels in the described constraints.
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Two methods are used to modify the network topology: one based on cryptology
algorithms, and one based on graph theory algorithms. A single method is used to re-route
network traﬃc through the new configuration of network connections, and is used to
finalize the network configurations for both topology change methods. The two topology
change methods are compared for computational speed, operational cost, and security.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: the second chapter provides
background information and reviews previous research, the third chapter examines the
methodology of this research, and the forth chapter provides the results. Finally, the fifth
chapter oﬀers conclusions and suggestions for further research.
4
2 Background and Previous Research
2.1 Introduction
Several areas provide the background required for this research. These areas include
both cryptology in general and the Advanced Encryption Standard in specific. Graph
theory is also examined, including methods of finding the shortest path between a set of
points. Additionally, linear programming and the multicommodity flow problem are
examined, along with several solution methods for the multicommodity flow problem.
Finally, previous research in the area of dynamic network design is reviewed.
2.2 Cryptology and the Advanced Encryption Standard
This research uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the modification of
network topologies. It was accepted as a general standard in November 2001 by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and shortly after by the National
Security Agency (NSA) as the standard for encrypting classified information. The
algorithm requires the plaintext, a substitution table, and a cipher key. The plaintext and
the cipher key are provided by the user of the algorithm while the substitution table is
provided by the algorithm itself. The algorithm follows four base steps in a series of
iterative rounds to produce the ciphertext. The four steps are SubBytes, ShiftRows,
MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. The number of rounds is dependent on key length and
can be 10, 12, or 14 rounds for key lengths 128, 192, and 256 bits, respectively. Data is
initially divided into blocks and each block is processed by the algorithm separately.
Regardless of key length, data is always divided into 16 byte chunks, which are arranged
in a 4x4 byte matrix [2] [3].
The SubBytes step uses a pre-generated table to modify the plaintext. The table is
generated by applying an aﬃne transformation over the multiplicative inverse of the finite
5
field GF(28). The 16x16 byte table is static and is used in all implementations of AES. For
each byte of plaintext data, a substitution is performed. The largest four bits of a given
byte determine the row index of the table while the smallest four bits determine the
column index. The entry at that spot on the table replaces the original data byte [2] [3].
ShiftRows is the second step. The 4x4 matrix of substituted data is grouped by rows
and each row is circularly left shifted based on an oﬀset. Each shift operates on a full byte
of data. The oﬀset starts at zero and increments with each row. This means that the first
row is not shifted; the second is shifted by one, and so on [2].
MixColumns is the third step and re-arranges the columns. Each column of the
shifted data matrix is treated as a polynomial over the finite field GF(28), and is multiplied
by a fixed polynomial, a(x) = (03)x3 + (01)x2 + (01)x + (02), modulo x4 + 1 [2]. This
operation modifies the data in place, using each byte of the column to aﬀect the result of
each final byte in the column. This provides diﬀusion in the output, adding additional
security to the final ciphertext.
The final step is AddRoundKey. The user enters a password or pass-phrase at the
beginning of the process. This password is used to generate a set of round keys; one round
key is used per round of the process. The number of rounds dictates the required key size,
and the round key generation process diﬀers slightly, depending on these factors. The key
generation process starts by generating a master key, and each round key consists of a set
number of bits from this master key. These keys are generated before the AES algorithm
begins and are used in this step. The AddRoundKey step itself consists of a basic XOR,
using the round key and the mixed data matrix. This produces the final output of the
round [2].
The pseudo-code of the process is shown in Figure 2.1. Note that a round key is
added to the data before rounds begin, and that the columns are not mixed in the final
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round. This is by design, to account for the accompanying decryption process. That
decryption process is not used in this research.
Figure 2.1: AES encryption process
This research utilizes the AES algorithm to modify the configuration of network
edges. The methodology for this process is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
2.3 Graph Theory
A graphical description of a network G includes the set of nodes N and the set of
possible edges E. This relationship is described mathematically as G = (N, E). An
undirected graph consists of edges that are bidirectional between nodes while a directed
graph contains edges that may only carry information in a single direction. This research
assumes edges are bidirectional.
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If the goal is to select edges to connect nodes, a number of shortest-path algorithms
can connect given node-pairs one at a time. These algorithms include Dijkstra’s and
Bellman-Ford [4]. However, the goal is not only to connect a given list of node-pairs, but
also to ensure the network is whole. Additionally, as the number of node-pairs grows, the
time to generate the shortest-path list grows with it. If the selected algorithm connects
pairs in sequence, such as Dijkstra’s, rather than in parallel, this growth is linear.
Edges are described by weights, or costs, that are associated with that edge. For this
research, all costs are assumed to be positive. For this phase, the capacity ue of the edge is
used as the edge weight. However, a higher capacity edge means more cost is associated
with that edge. Practically, these operational costs include the cost of installing and
maintaining the transmission medium as well as any power or administrative demands of
the medium. For example, this would cover the cost to run a fiber line, the installation
technicians, and the network administrators.
A minimum spanning tree aims to connect all nodes for the least amount of cost. By
design, the network is only minimally connected, but the network is whole. However, the
minimum connections may not be enough to carry all of the required network traﬃc.
Additional edges must then be found to handle the network load using another algorithm,
which defeats the use of a minimum spanning tree as a solution. As with the shortest-path
algorithms, speed of the overall algorithm becomes a constraining factor.
A generalized Steiner tree finds the minimum-cost selection of network edges that
connects all given node pairs. This is done by examining all node-pairs in parallel. The
algorithm examines the connections between the set of source nodes and the neighbors of
the source nodes. If this examination does not connect the node pairs, the process repeats.
The original source node is replaced with the least-costly neighbor, and the algorithm uses
the least-costly neighbor instead. The process continues until all node-pairs are connected,
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not just the requested set of node-pairs. Additionally, the algorithm will identify a path
between all node-pairs [5].
The generalized Steiner tree problem is essentially an optimization problem; network
cost must be minimized. Linear programming is an established technique for solving such
problems. Linear programming consists of an objective function and a set of constraints.
Frequently, the objective function is a minimization or maximization problem. If a linear
program is required by the constraints to have an integer solution, it is known as an integer
program. A mixed integer linear program contains some constraints that are required to be
an integer while other constraints are not under that restriction. A formal linear program is
defined in the format [6]:
min cx (2.1)
Subject to:
Ax = b
x ≥ 0
The first line defines the objective function. The matrix A contains the coeﬃcients of
the variables used in the model constraints. Similarly, b and c are corresponding vectors
that contain equality information and the coeﬃcients of the objective function,
respectively. In this notation, x is also a vector of the model variables and non-negativity
is imposed on the final solution values. A standard-form linear program is a minimization
problem.
Also important to this research is the concept of dual linear programs. A linear
program that can be inverted is known as a primal problem, whilst the inverse is known as
the dual problem. For example, the primal minimization problem often has a
corresponding dual maximization problem, and vice versa.
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The Steiner tree algorithm is described as a dual linear program in [5]:
min
∑
e∈E
ue ye (2.2)
∀n ⊆ N : n ∈ S
∑
e∈δ(S )
∀e ∈ E : ye ≥ 0
max
∑
n⊆N:∃i,n∈ni
xS (2.3)
∀e ∈ E :
∑
N:e∈δ(S )
ye ≤ ue
∀n ∈ S xS ≥ 0
The primal minimization problem focuses on minimizing the total cost of all edges
added to the network. Here, n refers to a given specific node, e to a given specific edge,
and S to the set of edges comprising of the path. The variable ye indicates if a network
connection is present in the configuration, or not. The dual maximization problem
increases the amount of flow, xS on a given path until the capacity of the edge is reached.
At that point, the path is added to the network. Use of the linear programming approach
means the Steiner tree problem does not suﬀer from linear growth dependent on the length
of the list of node-pairs as in the shortest-path approach. Instead, the growth is entirely
dependent on the total number of nodes and increases exponentially. Since the linear
problem considers the node-pairs in parallel, it also does not suﬀer from requiring
additional edges later in the algorithm, as in the minimum spanning tree.
Typically, the generalized Steiner tree problem includes a phase to delete any
extraneous edges. This phase is skipped in this research because the generalized Steiner
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tree is only used to identify network edges, not paths for the network traﬃc. Removing
edges at this step of the research limits the path selection later.
2.4 Multicommodity Flow
A transportation network is a network that carries goods or services over a set of
edges where each edge has both a capacity and a congestion level. When multiple types of
goods or services share the same infrastructure, it is known as a multicommodity flow
network. Examples include airline route scheduling, fluids in pipes, and computer
networks. A multicommodity flow problem takes a set of source and destination nodes, a
set of edges between the nodes, and a set of network traﬃc demands to generate a set of
paths for the network traﬃc. Without a path, the network information (or goods or
services) cannot flow between the source and the destination. In the case of computer
networks, demands include email traﬃc, streaming audio/video traﬃc, cloud applications,
etc.. These demands are also known as commodities.
Even within computer networking, the applications of the multicommodity flow
problem vary from basic network design to dynamic network topologies. A maximum
concurrent flow problem is a set of commodities K that must all be routed through a
network. The problem lies in defining the set of paths between every source and
destination node pairs to carry the commodities so that no network edge is over its
capacity.
Due to the variety of applications, a common set of terminology and symbology is
required. A network is defined as a graph G with a set of nodes N and a set of node edges
E. This relationship is described mathematically as G = (N, E). The total number of nodes
is n and edges is m. Network devices may be connected with multiple interfaces,
enumerated by f .
Commodities are enumerated by k, a source node by i, and a destination node by j.
For each edge e ∈ E, edge capacity, ui j f , and cost information are known. Cost
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information includes both the operational cost of including any given edge in the set of
paths, eco, and the congestion cost, ecc, of using an edge e for another unit of flow from a
commodity. Practically, these operational costs include the cost of installing and
maintaining the transmission medium as well as any power or administrative demands of
the medium. For this research, edge capacity and operational cost are fixed values. Edges
are bi-directional and the costs and capacities may be diﬀerent for each direction. The
value xki j f shows the percentage of flow over a given edge in path P for commodity k
between source i and destination j over interface f . The demand that each commodity
requires for transmission is also known, and is represented by dk.
The multicommodity flow problem is an optimization problem; flow must be
maximized or costs minimized. As a linear program, the concurrent multicommodity flow
problem is formulated as:
min
∑
e∈E
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∑
k∈K
ccc
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ + ce (2.4)
∀e ∈ E :
∑
k∈K
xki j f ≤ ui j f
∀k ∈ K : 0 ≤ xki j f ≤ ui j f
∀k ∈ K : xk = dk
The formulation calls for the minimization of network costs while fully routing all
commodities and not exceeding any edge capacity. Specifically, the objective function
considers all commodity and edge costs. The first constraint ensures that the flow over an
edge does not exceed the capacity of an edge. The second constraint ensures that
commodities are not dropped, and the last constraint ensures that commodity demand is
fully routed. The addition of constraining the flow to an integer would make this an
integer program.
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A number of properties are associated with linear programs. Most important to this
research is the strong duality theorem. The strong duality theorem, given by [6], describes
the optimality of a given pair of linear programs.
Strong Duality Theorem If any one of the pair of primal and dual problems has a finite
optimal solution, so does the other one and both have the same objective function
values.
Once a solution is found, optimality must be considered since a feasible solution does
not guarantee an optimal solution. Optimality is important for both the general
multicommodity flow problem and the dynamic network topology problem to ensure that
all commodities are routed in the most eﬃcient way possible. A dual linear program is
created, so optimality is verified via the strong duality theorem. In this case, the dual to
the minimum cost problem is the maximum flow problem.
However, finding the optimal solution often requires an unacceptable time to
generate. The solution for the concurrent multicommodity flow problem is dependent on
the number of nodes and number of commodities. Additionally, several paths may exist
for a given source-destination-commodity combination. Approximation algorithms are
required to find near-optimal solutions, guaranteed within a given margin of acceptability.
This margin adds an error parameter  > 0 to the problem. The parameter works with the
network flow to provide a solution that is within (1 − ) of the optimal minimal cost.
Dantzig’s simplex method given in [6] executes a series of operations, retaining a
feasible solution to the problem after each step. The ellipsoid method in [5] improves on
the simplex method and runs in polynomial time. The ellipsoid method allows for
constraint violation during intermediate steps of the algorithm, but the final result is a
feasible solution. The Ford-Fulkerson algorithm from [7] divides the network into two
sets to find the maximum flow between two given nodes. However, these solutions all
13
assume a single commodity per network, and are inadequate for the maximum concurrent
multicommodity flow problem.
This research’s solution begins with randomized rounding to create an approximate
solution. A network and its demands are first described as an integer program and relaxed
to a linear program by removal of the integer constraints. The new linear program is
solved, and the solution is rounded to obtain the integer solution. The rounding process is
known as randomized rounding [5]. Young’s work extends this by dropping the
requirement of solving the linear program in favor of conditional probability operators that
are independent of the optimal solution [8]. For the maximum concurrent multicommodity
flow problem, the shortest path between a given pair of nodes is used as the independent
operator. Garg and Konemann [9] extend Young’s work further by routing additional units
of flow per iteration of the algorithm. This allows the algorithm to run in (2k log k) C2 Tsp
time, where k ≥ mn , Tsp is the time to compute the shortest path, and C2 =
1

log1+ m1− .
Fleischer further improves [9] when the number of commodities is large by selecting
the -approximately shortest path instead of the shortest path [10]. Fleisher first describes
a linear program to maximize network flow:
max x (2.5)
∀e :
∑
P:e∈P
xi j f ≤ ui j f
∀k :
∑
p∈Pkxi j f
≥ xdk
∀P : xi j f ≥ 0
(2.5) focuses on maximizing the number of commodities routed, regardless of the
network cost. However, the problem formulation is still bounded both by the capacity of
each network link, and the commodity demands. The problem also demands that each
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path chosen for a commodity has some flow over that collection of edges. The dual of this
maximization problem is the minimization of the network costs:
min
∑
e∈E
ui j f ecc (2.6)
∀k,∀e ∈ Pk :
∑
e∈P
ecc ≥ zk
∑
k∈K
dkzk ≥ 1
∀e ∈ E : ecc ≥ 0
∀k ∈ K : zk ≥ 0
The dual introduces a new variable. Commodities are given weights, zk, that control
the shortest path between two nodes. Weights represent the cost of not routing the
remainder of the commodity demand. The shortest path must be at least the weight of a
commodity; that is, the commodity must be fully routed. Fleischer’s work describes an
approximation algorithm that solves the dual problem in O ∗ (−2n(n + k)) time [10].
Starting with a null solution, Fleischer’s algorithm iterates until a proper solution is
found. Each commodity is examined to route at least dk units by performing a series of
steps. The first step examines the shortest path as defined by the cost function l(e), which
will have some bottleneck ui j f . Here, l(e) = eoc + ecc. The next step routes min(dk, ui j)
along the path. The cost function is then multiplied by
(
1 +  min(dk ,u)max(e)
)
to accommodate the
change in the network that the routing imposes as well as the error parameter. When
∑
e∈E max(e) l(e) ≥ 1 and all commodities are examined, the solution is considered proper
and the algorithm stops. It is shown in [10] that the algorithm runs in O(−2e(e + k)) time.
In this way, the primal and the dual programs are solved together, and the dual solution is
used to verify the approximate optimality of the primal.
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The algorithm is upperly bounded by the total flow of the sum of the commodities.
That is, once the traﬃc has been routed, the algorithm is guaranteed to stop [10]. The
algorithm is lowerly bounded by the total flow divided by the number of commodities,
which is at least one. The lower bound also serves to scale the optimal solution, if the
algorithm fails to halt in the guaranteed time. The optimal solution and the lower bound
are inversely proportional, and by manipulating the demands of the commodities, the
algorithm retains the guaranteed run time [10] [9]. Further, Fleischer [10] proves:
Fleischer Theorem An -approximate solution to the maximum multicommodity flow
problem can be obtained in O ∗ (−2m(k + m)) time.
This research uses Fleischer’s algorithm for maximum concurrent multicommodity
flow once the configuration of the network has been modified. By re-routing the network
flow, this research ensures that the network remains mission-ready.
2.5 Previous Research
The dynamic network topology area builds from survivable network design, network
load balancing and virtual network reconfiguration, and wireless communications.
Williamson and Shmoys define survivable network design as “low-cost networks that
can survive failures of the edges” [5]. In a survivable network, traﬃc routes are adapted to
compensate for the loss of an edge. Ho and Cheung present a generalized survivable
network that is survivable independent of dynamic traﬃc [11]. Agarwal focuses on a
survivable network with fixed capcities, and utilizes multi-commodity flows to create
minimum-cost survivable networks [12]. This means that networks designed to be
survivable are networks that can be eﬀectively re-configured to generate multiple feasible
topologies.
Network load balancing ensures that a given network edge is not over-congested.
Traﬃc that congests an edge is dynamically re-routed to improve performance of the
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network. In [13], fiber-optic networks are examined to iteratively distribute load among
diﬀerent light paths between nodes. Further, [14] examines the logical network topology
to add and remove light paths to accommodate dynamic traﬃc demands. Tran, Casucci,
and Timm-Giel examine a series of virtual networks sharing a physical network
infrastructure. As virtual networks appear and disappear, they must be re-distributed to
eﬀectively utilize the physical infrastructure as eﬃciently as possible [15].
Communicating over a wireless network, by design, oﬀers various strategies and
protocols for adapting to networks whose nodes and edges can appear and disappear.
Specifically, Erwin [16] and Compton [1] investigate mobile ad-hoc networks. Mixed
integer linear programming is used to solve survivable network design problems, and both
Erwin and Compton use mixed integer linear programming in their works [1, 16–18].
In both Erwin and Compton’s work, the following assumptions are made:
• There are a fixed number of nodes.
• Multiple commodities are routed on the network.
• Each commodity has a single source and destination node, for a unique
source-destination-commodity tuple.
• Edges have fixed capacities.
• Nodes may have many interfaces.
• Two nodes are limited to one connection per interface.
• Nodes cannot connect to themselves.
• A node cannot possess more edges than interfaces.
The given assumptions also hold for this research. Compton additionally assumes
that edges are bi-directional and have equal capacity in both directions. While this
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additional assumption is convenient for his research, it is later shown that bi-directional
equal-capacity edges are not a requirement for establishing a solution. From these
assumptions, the following mixed integer linear program is developed by Erwin and
expanded by Compton:
min
∑
(i, j, f )∈E
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
K∑
k=1
(vki j f + b
k
i j f )x
k
i j f
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ +
∑
(i, j, f )∈E
ci j f yi j f +
K∑
k=1
1000rkmk (2.7)
subject to:
yi j f = 0 or 1 ∀(i, j, f ) ∈ E
yi j f ≤ a
′
i j f ∀(i, j, f ) ∈ E
yi j f = y ji f ∀(i, j, f ) ∈ E
xki j f ≤ yi j f ∀(i, j, f ) ∈ E, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
xki j f ≥ 0 ∀(i, j, f ) ∈ E, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
K∑
k=1
rkxki j f ≤ capi j f ∀(i, j, f ) ∈ E
∑
j∈N
yi j f ≤ ui f ∀i ∈ N, 1 ≤ f ≤ F
mk = 0 or 1 ∀1 ≤ k ≤ K
∑
j, f :(i, j, f )∈E
xki j f −
∑
j, f :(i, j, f )∈E
xkji f =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 − mk if i = sk
mk − 1 if i = dk ∀i ∈ N, i ≤ k ≤ K
0 else
The objective function separately sums the usage and congestion costs for the
network. The final term is added as a penalty for dropping commodities; any dropped
commodity increases the final solution by a factor of 1000. The constraints restrict the
solution to active edges of a network, restrict the variables to integer values, and ensure
that capacities are not exceeded and that demands are fully routed. The final constraint,
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added by Compton, restricts against simple loops. That is, a route traveling from node A
to node B and back to node A is prohibited.
Erwin’s network data contains up to 39 nodes, and each unique pair of nodes requires
a commodity. Additionally, Erwin does not assume the network has enough capacity to
route all commodity demands. A commodity-priority system is built into his algorithm to
selectively drop commodities as needed. He begins by establishing a network backbone
by use of a degree-constraining minimum spanning tree, and then expands the backbone
into a full mesh network by use of several methods. The degree-constraining minimum
spanning tree connects each node to no more than a given number of other nodes. A mesh
network connects nodes in such a way so that each node can serve as an intermediate point
between another pair of nodes. These methods include two link-adding heuristic
approaches and solving the mixed integer linear program. The two heuristic approaches
generate solutions significantly faster, but overall drop more commodities than the mixed
integer approach. However, Erwin is unable to find a mixed integer solution for networks
with more than 15 nodes within 30 minutes. Scalability of the mixed integer approach is a
concern [16].
Compton expands Erwin’s work by adding a metric to track significant diﬀerences in
the generated network and a mechanism to periodically re-generate a solution. Compton’s
diﬀerence metric is used in this research to compare diﬀerences in generations of a
particular network model. Additionally, Compton modified Erwin’s objective function to
include the term bki j f as a penalty term for re-using edges. By penalizing edge re-use, the
generated topology is more likely to route a commodity over a diﬀerent route, thus
increasing the diﬀerences between network configurations. This term is tracked by
commodity so that a second commodity is not unjustly penalized for using a path another
commodity previously used.
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While Compton included Erwin’s penalty term for dropping commodities, this
research drops the term. If a network previously routed a set of commodities,
modifications to the network configuration must not drop any commodities. Otherwise,
the potential for significant mission impacts is present. Any modifications to the
underlying network structure should not change existing network functionality.
Compton tests a number of network configurations after his modifications to Erwin’s
approach. Nodes number from 5 to 40, in 5-node increments, while interfaces are limited
to a maximum of five. Nodes are the source of up to 3 commodities. Compton found that
the number of nodes and interfaces contributed more to the generation time than the
number of commodities [1]. Due to the long running times, several network
configurations were not completed. For example, the slowest solution of the 30 node 4
interface 3 commodity configuration took 47 days to generate. However, network
configurations with a high number of nodes and interfaces were found to contain edges
that were not active across all generations. This ensures that an attacker listening on a
particular network edge does not receive 100% of the traﬃc over that link. Compton’s
results show the security of adapting the network configuration, but the generation time
and limited network size is unacceptable for operational use.
2.6 Summary
This chapter discussed the underlying concepts and theory behind this research. The
cryptology algorithm examined one approach to the broader dynamic network topology
problem while the Steiner tree algorithm examined the second approach. Fleisher’s
multicommodity flow algorithm allows the re-routing of network traﬃc. Erwin and
Compton’s work serve as a baseline for comparisons. The next chapter will discuss the
development of the methodology in detail.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Problem
The physical network layer deals in circuits, transmission modes, and the design of
transmission media; not in security. However, the raw bits of a packet must still pass over
a physical connection. If a network edge is compromised, the most secure solution that
preserves network operational status is to shut the edge oﬀ and reroute any traﬃc through
the rest of the network. It is safest to keep even heavily encrypted data away from an
attacker; while the field of cryptology steadily improves so does the field of
crypto-analysis.
The more network edges that are compromised, the more diﬃcult it is to keep
network traﬃc from transmitting over a compromised edge. It is better to reconfigure the
network so traﬃc is evenly balanced over secure network edges while maintaining
network functionality. The reconfiguration must be generated and implemented quickly to
minimize the amount of data sent over the compromised network connection. It must also
take network and operational costs and constraints into account to maintain both network
functionality, quality of service, and mission needs. Finally, the solution must apply
enough change to the network topology relative to both current and past configurations
such that an attacker must re-scan the network.
Speed is a vital factor, and directly ties to solution scalability. Ideally, the solution is
fast enough to generate, verify, and implement a topology change during an active attack.
The solution should also be fast enough to reconfigure the network at regularly scheduled
intervals. However, operational networks range in size from small standalone networks
servicing a specific mission need to large enterprise networks servicing entire agencies.
As the network size and interconnectivity grows, the scale of the problem grows
exponentially.
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Operational costs and constraints include maintenance costs, connectivity
requirements, service requirements, and service demands. Costs are both financial and
man-power related, and also includes the cost of routers, switches, and other networking
equipment. Connectivity requirements dictate which network nodes directly connect to
other nodes. It may be impossible to directly connect two nodes due to distance or other
limiting factors. Additionally, any given connection may be the compromised connection
that administrators wish to avoid. Network services cannot be impacted by the change in
network connections; each service requires a path between any two given nodes and
consumes an amount of bandwidth over the edges in that path. For example, an email
server has diﬀerent network requirements than a streaming media server and both servers
must be accommodated appropriately. Traﬃc must be carefully balanced to avoid
over-saturating any given network edge.
Finally, the solution must force an attacker to expend resources and re-scan the
network. The current and previous network configurations are considered when
generating a new configuration to ensure the network is changed in a non-trivial manner.
Insignificant changes allow an attacker to either ignore the changes or recall a previous
configuration. Additionally, the solution algorithm itself requires a certain amount of
security to ensure an attacker cannot perform the same calculations and arrive at the same
set of network changes. This would allow an attacker to anticipate any changes and alter
the attack accordingly.
This research assumes the network possesses redundant paths between network
nodes. Any mission critical network where impacts to availability cause severe damage
will contain redundant measures by DoD and NIST regulations to maintain approval to
operate the network.
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3.2 Algorithm
There are two main phases to the dynamic network topology algorithm presented
here: the network edge shift phase, performed either by the AES cryptology algorithm or
the Steiner tree algorithm, and the network routing phase, solved as a maximum
concurrent multicommodity flow problem.
3.2.1 AES. The AES algorithm is used to ’encrypt’ the network topology. Crucial
to the security of the AES algorithm is the secret key. This is perhaps even more crucial in
this application due to the diﬀerence in the outputted ’ciphertext’. In standard cryptology,
the resulting ciphertext is nonsense data that is generally useless without access to either
the key or the plaintext. In this application, it must be presumed that an attacker scans
both the original ’plaintext’ network topology as well as the re-configured ’ciphertext’
network. Without proper key handling, reversing the process becomes trivial and an
attacker will be able to anticipate network shifts. Each new network topology modification
uses a secure hash chain to generate a new set of keys. The keys are used only once to
prevent any mathematical analysis on the algorithm using the ’plaintext’ and ’ciphertext’
network topology information.
The hash begins with a user-generated pass phrase. The pass phrase is hashed using
the Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-2) with a 512 bit block size. The resulting hash is
chained 5000 times for additional security. The final result is used to generate the AES
round keys.
The network topology itself is represented as a dynamic two dimensional array, with
an optional third dimension to represent multiple network interfaces. Array indexes
represent nodes while the value at that index represents the on/oﬀ status of the connection
between each set of nodes. A one represents an active edge between nodes; a zero
represents an inactive edge. Allowing for multiple network interfaces allows for the
representation of routers, switches, and other network equipment that makes multiple
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connections. Workstations and servers can have multiple interfaces if multiple network
cards are available. Complete network information is stored in each half of the array; the
status of the connection between nodes A and B is the same as status of the connection
between nodes B and A. Connections between a node and itself are oﬀ by default.
Symmetry is maintained between the halves to show bidirectional connections. While
maintaining symmetry is convenient for this research, it is unnecessary for the general
algorithm. A second network array is maintained to represent the availability of the
connection between each set of nodes that are possible to connect. This adjacency matrix
is checked before any network connection is modified to ensure that any network change
is feasible. For example, a node may not connect to itself.
The AES algorithm is slightly modified for use in this research: the algorithm round
computations are modified to account for three-dimensional space. The modification
repeats the row shift step for the array slice containing the network interface information.
This extra step is only performed when the input network contains multiple interfaces. It
is not enough to perform the AES algorithm separately on each interface, as in typical
two-dimensional cryptological functions. If the algorithm is performed separately on each
interface, network connections would only shift along the same interface. Allowing
connections to shift between network interfaces increases the number of possible network
configurations.
It is important to address the impacts this modification has to the cryptanalysis of
AES. In [19], the creators address diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis through the
propagation of bit patterns over the algorithm steps. Daemen and Rijmen state the
ShiftRow has the properties:
• The column weight of a pattern at its output is lower bounded by the maximum of
the byte weights of the columns of the pattern at its input.
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• The column weight of a pattern at its input is lower bounded by the maximum of the
byte weights of the columns of the pattern at its output.
• Byte weight is invariant as there is no inter-byte interaction.
This research copies the ShiftRow step to create the ShiftInterface step and the same
properties hold. In Daemen and Rijmen’s analysis, the bit patterns and column weights
before and after the ShiftRow and MixColumn steps are examined. The additional step
changes output patterns and weights to include the ShiftInterfaces step. The weights
determine eﬀectiveness of diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis. The ShiftInterfaces step
provides further diﬀusion of the bit pattern, since the step moves bits of one layer into
another. The weight impact on each layer is nominal and the analysis provided by
Daemen and Rijmen holds.
The algorithm is performed across the entire network array. One half of the network
array is designated as the primary half; as modifications are made to the primary half, the
secondary half is updated to reflect the primary half. This maintains the bi-directionality
of the network connections. Bi-directionality is not a strict requirement; if edges are not
bi-directional, the entire network array is required for the complete network configuration.
Table 3.1 shows how the AES algorithm is applied to the network array. Figures 3.1
and 3.2 show the input and output of the algorithm in graphical form. The substitution,
shift row and modified mix column steps are applied to the network array. If required, the
additional shift interfaces step is applied after the mix columns step. Finally, the round
key step is applied. The number of rounds is dependent on network size.
Two verification steps check to ensure the network remains a single network with all
nodes connected. The first verification checks to ensure all nodes are connected to a
network by examining the values in the network array. If a node is found without any
connections, an edge is added to the network array to establish a connection. The check
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then searches for the node with the most connections, and a connection is removed from
that node. This maintains a constant number of active network edges.
The second verification checks to ensure the network remains a single network
instead of multiple independent networks. A breadth first search begins with any node and
checks connectivity to all other nodes. If any node cannot be reached from the chosen root
node, a sub-network is found. These sub-networks are connected to the root network by
adding the appropriate edges to the network array. Again, edges are removed from the
most connected nodes to maintain the number of active network edges. Both verification
steps must pass for the network topology to be valid, and any corrections are re-verified to
assure no additional topology issues are introduced.
The number of active links is maintained to control the verification steps, which must
add links to fix any inconsistencies the network AES reconfiguration process. While a
single network containing all nodes is required, a network topology with every network
edge active is undesirable. The fully connected network does not allow further
reconfigurations without removing network connections, and removal does not occur
automatically. To preserve the general network state during the verification stage, it is best
to remove links in equal number to those added. Otherwise, the configuration must begin
again to find a valid network configuration.
Ten generations are performed per execution. This allows for the method to use the
output from one generation as the input to the next; which in turn allows for the tracking
of diﬀerences between generations.
3.2.2 Steiner. The second approach follows the Steiner tree approach and is
implemented in a similar way to the AES approach. Two additional matrices are needed;
one to store the distance between node pairs and one to store the next step in the path
between node pairs. Only the ’next step’ is required; at each step in the path, there exists
the path between the ’next step’ node and the destination node.
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A B C D
A 0 0 1 1
B 0 0 0 1
C 1 0 0 0
D 1 1 0 0
(a) Original Network
A B C D
A 0 1 1 1
B 1 0 0 1
C 1 0 0 0
D 1 1 0 0
(b) SubBytes
A B C D
A 0 0 1 1
B 0 0 0 1
C 1 0 0 1
D 1 1 1 0
(c) ShiftRows
A B C D
A 0 0 1 1
B 1 0 0 1
C 0 0 0 1
D 1 1 1 0
(d) ShiftColumns
A B C D
A 0 0 0 1
B 0 0 1 0
C 0 1 0 1
D 1 0 1 0
(e) AddRoundKey
Table 3.1: AES Process in a Network
Figure 3.1: Original Network
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Figure 3.2: Shifted Network
The approach begins by hashing a user-provided pass phrase using the SHA-512 hash
algorithm. The hash is hashed again creating a hash chain until enough bits to populate the
network matrix have been generated. These bits are assigned to the network matrix to
create a starting set of edges. If the hash produces a whole network, the algorithm moves
immediately to re-routing the network traﬃc. The distance matrix is initialized to infinity,
represented by a suﬃciently large integer, and the next-step matrix is initialized to null.
The distance matrix initialization depends on the presence of an edge in the adjacency
matrix. If an edge exists, the distance is set to the activation cost. Otherwise, the distance
is infinity.
Otherwise, the node pairs are ordered by priority, determined by the total demand. A
higher priority is granted to a node pair with a larger demand. The Floyd-Warshall
shortest-path algorithm is used to generate the set of shortest paths, using the set of
possible edges as a reference. If a pair of nodes is not already connected, edges are added
to the network as determined by the path found by Floyd-Warshall.
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The same verification steps performed in the AES verification process are used here.
If a node is in the network, but not part of the randomly-generated node pairs, it may or
may not be included in the final network. The verification steps ensure that every node is
connected and the network is whole. In practice, each node will be part of a node-pair and
will be accounted for by the Steiner-based part of the algorithm. However, the verification
steps remain a best practice.
Similar to the AES approach, ten generations are performed per execution. After
each generation the distance matrix is re-initialized, based on the final configuration of the
previous generation. Any included edge is initialized to 1000 instead of infinity. The value
of 1000 was chosen as a suﬃciently large number greater than any possible network
demand. This weights the edge and discourages it from use in the next generation.
Edges unused in the generation are re-set to either the activation cost of the edge or
infinity, dependent on the adjacency matrix. The next step matrix is re-initialized to null.
This mirrors the original initialization. Each generation uses a new hash value. This sets
the initial set of edges based on the user’s pass phrase, with the phase serving as a ’secret
key’. As with the AES approach, this protects the results of the algorithm while allowing
the algorithm itself to be open.
3.2.3 Network Traﬃc Routing. The second phase re-routes the network traﬃc over
the re-configured network topology. Network traﬃc, like the network topology, is
represented as a dynamic three column array. The three columns represent the source of
the traﬃc, the destination, and the required bandwidth. The length of the array is
determined by the number of unique source-destination pairs. Multiple commodities
between the same source and destination are grouped together. The required bandwidth
for a commodity is based on the type of traﬃc between the source and destination. Traﬃc
types can be text, video, audio, etc.. This information, combined with the network
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topology and network connection capacity information, defines the maximum concurrent
multicommodity flow problem used in this research.
This research follows Fleischer’s algorithm, detailed in Chapter 2 [10]. The network
is initialized with a null solution and loops until the objective function value is at least
one. The algorithm then examines each commodity to see if the demand has been met. If
the commodity has not yet been routed, Dijkstra’s algorithm is employed to find the
shortest available path between the source and the destination. Note that the shortest
available path may not be the shortest path; the algorithm considers path feasibility and
will not route over edges that are not available or are overly congested. From there, the
bottleneck capacity is determined and routed. The bottleneck capacity is defined as the
minimum value between the available capacity on the edge and the commodity demand.
Finally, the objective function value is updated.
The paths generated from Fleischer’s algorithm are then examined and a set is
selected to cover all network commodities. This function starts by examining each
commodity’s source node, and the edges leading from the source node to a path to the sink
node for that commodity. The flow of the commodity is randomly split between
appropriate paths. It is possible for half the packets from a commodity routed through one
path and the other half routed through another path. All packets arrive at the destination
node. Commodity splitting depends on the current capacity of an edge and the demand of
the commodity. A commodity cannot be dropped for convenience; it must be routed. The
loop moves to the next node in the path and routes the commodity from there, stopping
when the next node is the destination. Once all commodities have chosen final paths, the
output is checked for both exceeding edge capacities and for failing to route commodity
demands, or dropping a commodity.
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Paths are not weighted between generations. The paths chosen for one generation
have equal opportunity to be re-chosen for the next, providing a similar set of edges is
available.
The result is a set of paths and flow for all commodities through the modified
network configuration.
3.3 Testing
To test the described methods, sample networks are generated. Each method
reconfigures the sample network, and a set of metrics are measured.
3.3.1 Experiments. Each network is described by the network size, number of
interfaces, and maximum edge capacity. Network size is the number of nodes that are in a
given network while number of interfaces determines the maximum number of physical
network connections a given node can make. Every network contains at least one network
interface to connect the network together; for example, a four-port switch is capable of
four network interfaces. For this research, network sizes of 5, 10, 15, 30, 50, 100, and
1000 nodes are tested with 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 interfaces.
The Network Simulator software is used to generate adjacency matrixes for each
combination of network size and number of interfaces. For statistical significance, each
combination is tested 5 times. The actual starting configuration of each method is
generated via a hashed user pass phrase.
At minimum, each network node can be expected to communicate with at least one
other node. Practically, each node will communicate with many other nodes. Minimum
communication covers only a single standard network service, such as e-mail or file
sharing. For this research, it is assumed that each node will communicate with one other
node in the network. The source and destination nodes are randomly paired and pass a
randomly generated amount of network traﬃc between the source and destination. The
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amount of network traﬃc does not exceed the given maximum edge capacities. Demands
of diﬀerent types of traﬃc, such as text or video traﬃc are not considered individually.
Rather, all traﬃc traveling from a source to a destination is grouped into a single
commodity. A source node can share both a low and high demand traﬃc type with the
destination; the generated amount of network traﬃc between the nodes is the total
communication between the nodes.
In practical use, the possible network edges, the base network description, and the
traﬃc requirements will be known from physical network configurations and customer
demands. These values can be directly inputted into each method.
The accuracy of the network routing portion can also be varied, ranging from 0 to 1.
However, the more accurate the selection of best paths, the slower the algorithm runs. For
each combination with 100 or fewer nodes, the accuracy level is set at .3. For each
combination with 1000 nodes, the accuracy level is loosened to .5 to accommodate the
increase in nodes and routing requirements.
All experiments run on the same hardware. While the methods may perform faster
with faster hardware, the hardware speed is not part of this research. The hardware
contains an Intel i7 2.67 GHz quad-core processor with 6 GB of random access memory.
Each processor contains two virtual processors for additional parallel processing. The
operating system is Ubuntu version 12.04, 64-bit.
3.3.2 Metrics. A primary concern of this research is the minimizing the cost of a
network topology generation while maintaining a valid output. To that end, several
metrics are considered. The network topology generation process is tested for speed and
scalability while the generated network topologies are examined for topological
diﬀerence, security and cost. It is not enough to evaluate the generation process alone; the
generation algorithm can produce and fast results for large networks without producing a
usable operational solution. All metrics must be considered in validating the algorithm.
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Speed and scalability are linked. The AES method runs in O((i2n3) + (−2e(e + n)))
time while the Steiner method runs in O((n3) + (−2e(e + n))) time. The second term in the
notation represents the running time of the network routing phase, where  represents the
accuracy level of the routing. The terms are separated because each phase runs in
sequence and not in parallel; the network routing phase is dependent on the completion of
the re-configuration phase. Each phase of algorithm execution measures run time of that
phase, and the total run time of the method is captured.
Each step in each method aﬀects the overall running time. Each step in the AES
method runs in O(i2n3) time, for each of the three steps: ShiftRows, ShiftColumns, and
ShiftInterfaces. The remaining steps, SubBytes and AddRoundKey, perform in O(in) and
O(n) time, respectively. The three Shift steps are individually complex, requiring O(in)
time per action for O(in2) worth of data. By contrast, the Steiner method runs in O(n3)
time, but each action is only O(1).
A formula for measuring topological diﬀerence is developed by Compton [1].
Essentially, each edge in a commodity’s path is examined to determine the amount of
diﬀerence for each edge-commodity pair between the original and updated topologies.
The formula is weighted based on the bandwidth requirements for each commodity and
the network size; changes to a high-bandwidth commodity in a small network are more
significant than changes to a low-bandwidth commodity in a large network. The amount
of change in the route for a given commodity is found by summing the absolute values of
the diﬀerences in each edge within the route. Absolute values are used to account for both
positive and negative changes over a particular network edge.
Here, the binary variable yi j f represents the inclusion of the i j f path in the set of
edges within a network. The diﬀerent network configurations, ω, are measured at diﬀerent
times, t1 and t2.
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Security of the network is diﬃcult to quantifiably measure. However, the goal of the
network reconfiguration is to move the paths over which data flows, thus preventing the
ease at which an attacker may gain access. To that end, security is measured through the
diﬀerence in the network topologies. Over a series of generations of a given configuration,
the amount of time any given edge is active is measured. Generational topological
diﬀerences are also compared using (3.1). It is essential that each generation’s topological
diﬀerence is compared not only to the immediately previous generation, but to a set of
previous generations. If the original and third network topologies are similar to each other,
and it is known that a network shifts topologies every hour, an attacker simply has to wait
three hours before re-attempting the attack.
Network node connectivity is measured to provide a framework for evaluating
topological diﬀerences. Configurations with high network connectivity have many options
for routing network traﬃc through the nodes and may display high topographical
diﬀerences. Similarly, a configuration with low connectivity has fewer routing options and
may display lower topographical diﬀerences. Basaras, Katsaros, and Tassiulas describe
the μ − PCI metric for calculating connectivity in [20].
The μ − PCI metric is found by first finding the node degree values. From there, each
node is compared to other nodes that are directly connected to it. The μ − PCI value of a
node is equal to the number of directly connected nodes with at least that amount of
degrees. For example, a node with a degree of 5 and neighbors with degrees of 3, 1, 4, 2,
and 5 would be assigned the μ − PCI value of 3 because there are 3 directly connected
nodes with degrees of at least 3. In this way, the metric looks at both centralness and
vitalness of a node; a bottleneck node that connects two highly-connected nodes receives a
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high μ − PCI value while a central hub node connecting lowly-connected nodes receives a
lower value.
By comparison, network cost is remarkably easy to measure. The cost is calculated
using (3.2) and displayed as output for the network administrator’s evaluation.
ωcost =
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(3.2)
Essentially, the costs of the network traﬃc demands are weighed with the number of
active edges in a given configuration. A configuration with high demands and a high
amount of connectivity will cost more than a network with low demands and low
connectivity. For comparison, the total possible cost with complete connectivity is
provided.
3.4 Summary
The methodology and evaluation approach is defined in this chapter. The AES and
Steiner methods are detailed along with all required parameters. Of those parameters, only
network size and network interfaces are varied. These two factors are suﬃcient to gather
the metrics necessary for determining the eﬀectiveness of the reconfiguration process.
These metrics include CPU time, generational topographical diﬀerences, and network
costs. Results and analysis of the factors and metrics are presented in the next chapter.
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4 Results and Analysis
This chapter details the results of the experiments discussed in Chapter 3. Results
include run times for each phase of the algorithm, topographical diﬀerences, and network
cost. The AES and Steiner methods are compared to establish which method performs
with better results. Additionally, the two methods are both compared to previous research.
4.1 AES Results
4.1.1 Execution Time. As predicted by the algorithm run time,
O((i2n3) + (−2e(e + n))), the speed of the AES method is dependent on both the number of
nodes and the number of interfaces. The dependency on number of interfaces is most
acutely seen with the 1000 node test network. The method was able to execute on a
network with 1000 nodes and 1 interface, but failed to execute on a 1000 node, 2 interface
network within an acceptable time frame. For this reason, the AES approach only includes
the 1000 node case with one interface.
The 1000 node, 2 interface case performed a single re-configuration; the execution
time was 12.5 days. As discussed during the goals of this research, a configuration that
takes days to generate is obsolete upon arrival. The 1000 node, 2 interface case fails to
execute in an acceptable amount of time. No analysis of other factors is required is
performed on this case. The remainder of the results for the AES method omits the 1000
node case where the number of interfaces is greater than one.
Figure 4.1 shows the total average run time for all 10 generations across the number
of performed experiments. Table 4.1 contains the standard deviation of the execution
times. Following the 1000 node, 2 interface case, the most significant spike in execution
time is between networks with one and two interfaces. This is due to the additional
computation time required to handle multiple interfaces; this is the point where the
matrices containing network information become three-dimensional. The added
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complexity of shifting interfaces as well as rows and columns corresponds to the most
drastic increase in total execution time. After the ShiftInterface step is introduced, the
additional time to compute 3, 4, and 5 interfaces is exponential, as predicted by the O()
characterization.
Results shown as 0 seconds executed in sub-millisecond time.
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
10−1
100
101
102
103
104
105
Interfaces
Ti
m
e 
(S
ec
on
ds
, L
og
 S
ca
le
)
Total Time for 10 Generations, AES
5 Nodes
10 Nodes
15 Nodes
30 Nodes
50 Nodes
100 Nodes
1000 Nodes
Figure 4.1: AES total times shows speed improvement over previous methods
Figure 4.2 shows the total average time per configuration, across all 50
configurations. Each experiment is performed 5 times, with 10 generations each
experiment, giving a total of 50 configurations. Again, it is shown the most drastic
increase in execution time for each generation is between one and two interfaces, no
matter how many nodes are in the network.
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1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0110 0.0110
10 Nodes 0.0110 0.0179 0.0167 0.0167 0.0363
15 Nodes 0 0.0110 0.0228 0.0110 0.1774
30 Nodes 0.0607 0.2338 0.1479 0.8065 1.4231
50 Nodes 0.3338 2.3441 6.7026 6.1676 24.0309
100 Nodes 2.5602 23.7758 7.7009 55.6639 117.5725
1000 Nodes 1563.014 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.1: Standard Deviation for Total Time for 10 Generations, AES, in units of network
flow
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Figure 4.2: AES generational times do not have large deviations from the mean
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1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.00168654 0.00386436 0.00193218 0.00337309 0.00429987
10 Nodes 0.00210818 0.00432049 0.00590291 0.00269979 0.00337309
15 Nodes 0.00559364 0.00597773 0.00571936 0.0078768 0.01736407
30 Nodes 0.00469515 0.01655160 0.0460260 0.05475602 0.12518856
50 Nodes 0.03198888 0.18894090 0.27712973 0.36084862 0.46111767
100 Nodes 0.13874100 1.49313718 1.57110967 2.77089367 14.7630
1000 Nodes 48.34405 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.2: Standard Deviation for Average Time per Generation, AES, in seconds
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the average time per generation for both the edge
re-configuration and traﬃc routing phases of the algorithm, both edge re-configuration
and traﬃc routing. In figure 4.3, values shown as 10−10 represent a sub-millisecond time.
The figures show that the two phases represent approximately half of the total run time for
a generation when the number of interfaces is low, but the time to route the network traﬃc
exponentially increases as the number of interfaces increases. This is due to the routing
phase finding paths through the network for all of the traﬃc. The AES re-configuration
only guarantees that the network is whole; it does not establish paths between the source
and destination nodes. The routing phase finds all possible paths before routing the traﬃc;
this enumeration and selection of routes takes time and slows the total speed of the
algorithm exponentially.
4.1.2 Network Costs. Network cost is calculated via Equation 3.2 and shown in
Figure 4.5. Both the dynamic routing costs and the static edge costs are considered for the
network. The total costs for each network are high, even for small networks. This is
mainly due to high traﬃc demands; a streaming video service consumes greater power and
resources than an e-mail service. If these high-demanding traﬃc sources are eliminated by
39
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
102
104
Interfaces
Ti
m
e 
(S
ec
on
ds
, L
og
 S
ca
le
)
Average Edge Shift Time per Generation, AES
5 Nodes
10 Nodes
15 Nodes
30 Nodes
50 Nodes
100 Nodes
1000 Nodes
Figure 4.3: AES edge re-configuration occurs with no growth across interfaces
business policy, as is the case with many firms, including the DoD, these costs would drop.
The figure shows that traﬃc demands are more significant than the number of network
nodes and interfaces; networks with lower nodes and interfaces are shown to have higher
costs than larger networks. This is most drastic in the case of 30 nodes, where the costs are
higher than both the 50 and 100 node cases when the three networks have one interface.
Examination of the network traﬃc demands show that a higher overall demand of the
network in the 30 node, 3 interface case than in the 50 and 100 node 3 interface cases.
Ideally, the traﬃc costs of a particular configuration should not exceed the total cost
as generated by the adjacency matrix and the list of traﬃc requirements. However,
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Figure 4.4: AES routeing time dwarfs edge re-configuration time exponentially
because the routing paths are not guaranteed to have the shortest path for a particular pair
of nodes, the cost of a configuration is frequently higher than the expected cost. The total
possible cost is calculated via:
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1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0 0 0 0.001686548 0
10 Nodes 0.00126491 0.00168654 0.00413118 0.00388730 0.00413118
15 Nodes 0.00193218 0.00397771 0.00432049 0.00505964 0.00379473
30 Nodes 0.00326598 0.0035023 0.0049170 0.00976160 0.00888444
50 Nodes 0.0070047 0.14755850 0.18955104 0.1327621 0.33203052
100 Nodes 0.01053248 0.99405378 1.4596769 1.84599337 2.04530482
1000 Nodes 6.8710018 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.3: Standard Deviation for Edge Shift Time per Generation, AES, in seconds
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.00168654 0.00386436 0.00193218 0.00505964 0.00429987
10 Nodes 0.00337309 0.00600704 0.01003410 0.00658709 0.00750427
15 Nodes 0.00752583 0.00995545 0.01003985 0.01293647 0.02115880
30 Nodes 0.00796113 0.02005398 0.0509431 0.06451762 0.13407301
50 Nodes 0.03899364 0.33649940 0.46668078 0.49361073 0.79314819
100 Nodes 0.14927349 2.48719097 3.03078659 4.6168870 16.8083448
1000 Nodes 55.21505 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.4: Standard Deviation for Traﬃc Route Time per Generation, AES, in seconds
ωpossible cost =
[
Σkk=1d
k + Σi, jNΣ
F
f=1e
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]
(4.1)
This equation is run against the adjacency matrix to find all possible edge costs, to
account for usable edges that are not included in a given configuration. The ratio between
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Figure 4.5: AES costs vary with traﬃc demands
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.0084 0.0054 0.0018 0.0056 0.0060
10 Nodes 0.0138 0.0117 0.0137 0.0086 0.0279
15 Nodes 0.0367 0.0312 0.0276 0.0260 0.0380
30 Nodes 0.1178 0.0889 0.0831 0.0967 0.1216
50 Nodes 0.1880 0.1656 0.1488 0.2657 0.2999
100 Nodes 0.2723 0.3610 0.4339 0.4831 0.6948
1000 Nodes 4.3306 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.5: Standard Deviation for Average Total Cost, AES, by formula 3.2
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the average calculated configuration cost and the total possible cost is given in Table 4.6.
The table shows that as the network size increases, either by increasing the number of
nodes or the number of interfaces, the relative cost of the network at each configuration
decreases as compared to the possible cost of the network.
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 18.778 4.9462 6.1031 6.8300 6.6291
10 Nodes 6.0404 14.8884 11.4425 7.3501 8.0124
15 Nodes 12.4686 10.1856 4.8587 6.3072 7.9257
30 Nodes 16.7472 9.0119 4.7109 5.2706 5.3081
50 Nodes 5.3305 4.2630 2.7469 3.3010 2.7337
100 Nodes 1.1037 1.0770 .8624 .6313 .6746
1000 Nodes .3916 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.6: Ratio of Configuration Cost vs. Total Possible Cost, AES, via formula 3.2
4.1.3 Network Diﬀerences. Generational topographical diﬀerences are calculated
against all 50 configurations of a given combination of nodes and interfaces via Equation
3.1. Figure 4.6 shows the results of the equation. Networks with 3 interfaces are shown to
have the most consistent diﬀerences, compared to the other possible network
configurations. Figure 4.6 also shows that the cases of 5 nodes with 1 and 5 interfaces
along with the 10 node and 15 node 1 interface cases to show no diﬀerences between each
generation.
Examinations of the final network configurations of each generation for those four
cases show that the network configuration does not deviate. The calculated configuration
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Figure 4.6: AES diﬀerences vary unpredictably over diﬀerent configurations
is a subset of the total available edges as given by the adjacency matrix for each case, but
the configurations do not change between generations as expected.
This is most likely due to the verification steps. Examinations of the network
configurations of these cases before the verification steps do show diﬀerences in the
overall configuration. However, the configurations were missing nodes or contained
multiple sub-networks instead of a single network. The verification steps address these
issues in a straightforward manner, and the resulting final configuration is the same in
each case, no matter the starting configuration before the verification. Similarly, the
routing phase selects paths in a programmatic way; given the same input of possible
edges, the same paths are repeatedly selected because the algorithm does not weight paths.
45
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0 0.0663 0.0566 0.0830 0
10 Nodes 0 0.0335 0.0249 0.0112 0.0078
15 Nodes 0 0.0215 0.0172 0.0080 0.0039
30 Nodes 0.0151 0.0051 0.0016 0.0007 0.0005
50 Nodes 0.0030 0.0018 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003
100 Nodes 0.0018 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
1000 Nodes 0.0000 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.7: Standard Deviation for Average Total Topological Diﬀerences, AES, in units of
network flow
Diﬀerences in topology can also be described by the percentage of edges that are
active across all generations. That is, the more edges that are less active over all time, the
greater the diﬀerences. Table 4.8 shows the number of edges that are active across every
generation.
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 8 10 14 10 14
10 Nodes 20 8 4 18 34
15 Nodes 28 4 8 14 24
30 Nodes 56 44 58 42 18
50 Nodes 78 18 2 6 350
100 Nodes 28 72 484 20 10
1000 Nodes 148 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.8: Active Edges in All Generations, AES
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In the cases of 10 and 15 nodes with 1 interface, the table shows that all generations
have every possible edge active. This situation does not allow for further configuration
changes; once a generation adds all possible edges, no edges are removed via the
verifications steps. The shifting phase still executes but no visible changes are made if all
the possible edges are already active.
In the other cases, the diﬀerences of the network are shown to decrease as the number
of interfaces increases. Logically, the diﬀerences should increase, given additional
dimensions to aﬀect change. The connectiveness of a node aﬀects the diﬀerences. If many
nodes are minimally connected, changing a given node’s connections may not have a great
eﬀect on the network as a whole. Table 4.9 shows the average μ − PCI values. The
μ − PCI value shows that as the number of interfaces increase, the amount of overall
connectiveness of a node actually decreases. Here, a node that connects to another node
over three diﬀerent interfaces is less connective than if it connects to three diﬀerent nodes
over the same interfaces. The average node connectiveness corresponds with the decrease
in topographic diﬀerences as interfaces increase; the fewer connections a node has, the
harder it is to make significant changes.
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 1 1 1 1 1
10 Nodes 3 1 1 1 1
15 Nodes 1 1 1 1 1
30 Nodes 7 3 1 1 1
50 Nodes 6 1 1 1 1
100 Nodes 1 1 1 1 1
1000 Nodes 8 NA NA NA NA
Table 4.9: Node Connectiveness, AES
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4.2 Steiner Results
4.2.1 Execution Time. Unlike the AES method, the Steiner method is not
dependent on the number of interfaces and runs in O((n3) + (−2e(e + n))) time. For that
reason the Steiner method executed on the 1000 node case with all tested numbers of
interfaces, providing a more complete analysis of the method. Figure 4.7 shows the total
time for 10 generations utilizing the Steiner method.
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Figure 4.7: Steiner times show improvement over AES times
Like the AES method, the 1000 node cases require an order of magnitude of
additional time to execute to completion. However, there is less of a pronounced diﬀerence
in networks with multiple interfaces as compared to networks with one interface. Notably,
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1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.02683281 0.038987177 0.036331804 0.03286335 0.02683281
10 Nodes 0.02449489 0.03577708 0.068410526 0.0558569 0.14071247
15 Nodes 0.04 0.041472883 0.05761944 0.07874007 0.1104536
30 Nodes 0.09230384 0.25242820 0.272249885 0.24190907 2.01148701
50 Nodes 0.17663521 0.66819158 1.320348439 0.614068 0.7501199
100 Nodes 1.00365332 3.08821631 3.266355768 2.09654954 3.05486497
1000 Nodes 42.7001171 22.57653649 21.77154106 34.1203751 24.1909073
Table 4.10: Standard Deviation for Total Time for 10 Generations, Steiner, in seconds
the time required for the 100 node cases remained similar across all tested interfaces while
the time required for the 50 and 30 node cases increased exponentially. This may lead to
the conclusion that the random generation of the starting configuration of this method
aﬀects the running time of each generation. If the starting hash sequence does not produce
a connected network, additional time is required to connect the set of node pairs.
However, if the hash sequence produces a connected network, the overall time
requirement is greatly reduced. This assumption is validated but the running times shown
in Figure 4.7, but it is later shown that this assumption is not the case.
Figure 4.8 shows the total average time per configuration, across all 50
configurations. This figure mirrors Figure 4.7. This means that the execution time of each
generation is approximately equal; meaning that no one generation causes a great eﬀect to
the total time.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the average time per generation for the edge
re-configuration and traﬃc routing phases of the algorithm, respectively. Figure 4.9 shows
that the network re-configuration time of each generation is minimal in all but the 1000
node cases. This shows that the edge selection phase of the algorithm has little eﬀect on
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Figure 4.8: Steiner interfaces contribute to overall generation time
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.00367574 0.00567254 0.00559364 0.00478887 0.00597773
10 Nodes 0.00339934 0.00597773 0.00631048 0.00337309 0.0156005
15 Nodes 0.00541602 0.00647731 0.00413118 0.00326598 0.01897366
30 Nodes 0.00731512 0.01347260 0.03216899 0.06871001 0.17851187
50 Nodes 0.02868681 0.02614149 0.16677063 0.14956470 0.19563639
100 Nodes 5.29456324 5.13688621 5.04285633 7.17275400 7.71494653
1000 Nodes 5.29456324 5.13688621 5.04285633 7.17275400 7.71494653
Table 4.11: Standard Deviation for Average Time per Generation, Steiner, in seconds
the overall running time of the generation of the new configuration. Figure 4.10 reflects
Figures 4.8 and 4.7. This shows that the total time is more aﬀected by the routing time
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than the edge selection time. As in figure 4.7, the 100 node case performs faster than the
50 node case at 3 interfaces, and faster than the 30 node case at 5 interfaces. This means
the previous conclusion of the aﬀect of the starting configuration on the run time is faulty;
this diﬀerence is better explained by the complexity of the network and the number of
possible paths for each commodity. The total computational time is increased by the
number of possible paths because more flexibility is available. Greater flexibility requires
more iterations for Fleisher’s approximation algorithm to produce a result within the
desired error limit. This shows the previous conclusion that the random starting
configuration aﬀecting the execution time is incorrect.
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Figure 4.9: Steiner edge re-configuration times shows great improvement over AES method
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Figure 4.10: Steiner traﬃc routing contributes most to overall generational time
4.2.2 Network Costs. Similar to the AES method, the total cost of the networks
generated by the Steiner method are high, even for small networks. The reasoning is the
same; traﬃc sources with higher requirements cost more to operate than traﬃc sources
with low demands. The costs are averaged over all iterations of experiments; that is, the
total cost shown in Figure 4.11, is the average cost over all 5 experiments for a given
node/interface combination.
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1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.0049170 0.00565685 0.004237 0.00463800 0.00498887
10 Nodes 0.00432049 0.0049170 0.00498887 0.00282842 0.00326598
15 Nodes 0.00266666 0.00461880 0.00227058 0.00279682 0.00500666
30 Nodes 0.00386436 0.00478887 0.00461880 0.00526624 0.00478887
50 Nodes 0.00461880 0.00579655 0.00379473 0.00337309 0.00500666
100 Nodes 0.01018931 0.01320605 0.01930342 0.03224627 0.04689278
1000 Nodes 1.09969692 2.66999791 4.05566818 4.69231049 5.47089267
Table 4.12: Standard Deviation for Average Edge Shift Time per Generation, Steiner, in
seconds
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.00859283 0.011329 0.009831047 0.00942688 0.01096661
10 Nodes 0.0077198 0.01089482 0.01129936 0.00620152 0.01886655
15 Nodes 0.00808269 0.01109611 0.00640176 0.0060628 0.023980328
30 Nodes 0.01117949 0.01826148 0.036787 0.07397626 0.18330074
50 Nodes 0.03330561 0.03193804 0.17056536 0.15293779 0.2006430
100 Nodes 0.11784225 0.15853878 0.21614289 0.15474253 0.23125764
1000 Nodes 6.394260177 7.80688413 9.09852452 11.865064 13.1858392
Table 4.13: Standard Deviation for Average Traﬃc Route Time per Generation, Steiner, in
seconds
The figure shows minimal diﬀerences between the costs over the number of
interfaces in a given network. The greatest diﬀerences in the cost come from adding
additional nodes to the network. The anomalies are the 50 and 100 node cases, which are
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Figure 4.11: Steiner costs are similar to AES costs
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 68.06964 183.2627 196.1926 1072.750 1131.2941
10 Nodes 3997.59901 23682.4348 46.735432 135.1845 357.3613
15 Nodes 800.30723 1027.8742 4108.57842 23411.093 65.0724
30 Nodes 82.65524 167.2656 436.03921 1546.4331 2995.3226
50 Nodes 23379.1335 59.7165 139.23153 371.9814 414.4486
100 Nodes 1553.0178 4741.2014 22581.06839 46.84479 155.3167
1000 Nodes 138.5919 1025.84670 1706.11418 2447.7096 23459.6333
Table 4.14: Standard Deviation for Average Total Cost, Steiner, via formula 3.2
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shown to be less costly than the 30 node cases. While the 50 and 100 node cases have
more commodities to route, examination of the generated commodity demands show that
many commodities for the 50 and 100 node cases are low demand. Further examination of
the 30 node cases shows high-demand commodities.
The same cost ratio analysis as in the AES analysis is performed. Table 4.15 shows
similar results as the AES method: as the number of interfaces or nodes increases, the
proportion of actual cost to theoretical cost decreases.
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 8.8456 6.3846 5.8761 7.0731 6.2837
10 Nodes 11.5772 4.5893 5.4021 5.8269 7.1074
15 Nodes 17.1274 9.4009 11.8164 8.7333 7.4068
30 Nodes 19.9478 11.5733 7.5770 10.1409 4.5425
50 Nodes 3.21015 1.8424 1.7222 1.1705 .9451
100 Nodes 1.7287 1.1961 .5553 .6291 .1976
1000 Nodes .2142 .0812 .0812 .0350 .0257
Table 4.15: Ratio of Configuration Cost vs. Total Possible Cost, Steiner, via formula 3.2
4.2.3 Network Diﬀerences. Generational topographical diﬀerences are calculated
against all 50 configurations of a given combination of nodes and interfaces via Equation
3.1. Figure 4.12 shows the resulting network diﬀerences of the equation. Smaller
networks are shown to have less overall diﬀerences than larger networks, with the
exception of the 50 node cases after 3 interfaces.
These results follow logical reasoning: Smaller networks are more sensitive to
change, and show the biggest diﬀerences for the smallest amount of overall changes. As
the number of network nodes and interfaces increase, the amount of change at the network
level decreases. For example, take the 100 node case and examine only the edge
55
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Interfaces
D
iff
er
en
ce
s
Average Differences, Steiner
5 Nodes
10 Nodes
15 Nodes
30 Nodes
50 Nodes
100 Nodes
1000 Nodes
Figure 4.12: Steiner diﬀerences exponentially decrease as interfaces linearly increase
re-configuration phase. Modifying 10 edges over one interface results in a 10% change.
However, modifying 15 edges over two interfaces only results in a 7.5% change, despite
the fact that more changes occurred. Consistent change is shown across interfaces in the 5,
100, and 1000 node cases while in the other cases greater diﬀerences are shown with a
fewer number of interfaces.
The average number of active edges and the connectivity of the network correspond
with the variations in the topographical diﬀerences. Table 4.17 shows the percentage of
active edges in a given network with respect to the adjacency matrix. Table 4.18 shows the
connectiveness of the nodes.
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1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0.1148 0.0741 0.0490 0.0678 0.0637
10 Nodes 0.0362 0.0275 0.0162 0.0088 0.0058
15 Nodes 0.0218 0.0157 0.0068 0.0032 0.0015
30 Nodes 0.0048 0.0017 0.0010 0.0005 0.0005
50 Nodes 0.0023 0.0007 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
100 Nodes 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
1000 Nodes 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4.16: Standard Deviation for Topological Diﬀerences, Steiner, in units of network
flow
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 0 0 0 0 0
10 Nodes 0 0 0 0 0
15 Nodes 0 0 0 0 0
30 Nodes 0 0 0 0 0
50 Nodes 0 0 0 0 0
100 Nodes 0 0 0 0 0
1000 Nodes 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.17: Number of Active Edges in All Generations, Steiner
The sparse network reflects the lack of diﬀerences shown in Figure 4.12. A fully
connected network is required; if a node has few neighbors, there are few options to
modify the connection.
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1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
5 Nodes 2 1 1 1 1
10 Nodes 3 1 1 1 1
15 Nodes 2 2 1 1 1
30 Nodes 4 2 1 1 1
50 Nodes 3 1 1 1 1
100 Nodes 4 1 1 1 1
1000 Nodes 60 30 7 9 3
Table 4.18: Node Connectiveness, Steiner
4.3 Comparisons
The AES and Steiner methods presented in this research are evaluated under the same
metrics. Comparisons between the methods are accomplished via a t-test.
The Steiner method provides greater topological diﬀerences in all but the 50 node 2
interface case at a 95% confidence level. Expanding the comparison to the 90%
confidence level does not prove the Steiner method provides greater topographical
diﬀerences in those cases.
Comparing the costs of the generated networks shows the methods are more equal.
The AES method produces cheaper networks for the 5 node cases with all interfaces; the
10 node 5 interface case; the 15 node 2 and 5 interface cases; the 30 node 1, 2, and 5
interface cases; and the 100 node 2 and 4 interface cases at the 95% confidence level. The
Steiner method; however, provides cheaper networks for randomly generated commodities
at the 5 node 1 interface case and the 30 node 1 interface case at the 90% confidence level.
Each generation of networks is sparse. This is almost by design; examination of the
starting adjacency matrices shows the set of possible network edges are also sparse
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networks. To test the methods of creating network diﬀerences on a complete network,
additional experiments are generated with the 50 node case. The adjacency matrixes are
modified to include every edge; each generation still contains a subset these possible
edges.
Figure 4.13 shows the amount of network diﬀerences for each method, on both a
complete and sparse set of possible network edges for the 50 node cases. Each line shown
represents the amount of diﬀerences for that case as a result of the topological diﬀerence
formula given by formula 3.1. The figure shows that a fully connected network generates
fewer diﬀerences than the sparse networks. Again, this is due to the availability of
additional edges. When more edges are available, more changes are required to show a
significant diﬀerence at the network level.
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Figure 4.13: Complete possible networks only assist diﬀerences if generated configuration
is not sparse
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1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
AES, 10−4 0.706 0.3495 0.2252 0.1387 0.1331
Steiner, 10−3 0.1921 0.1911 0.2311 0.1574 0.1229
Table 4.19: Standard Deviation, Diﬀerences in units of network flow
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
AES 1 1 1 1 1
Steiner 6 1 1 1 1
Table 4.20: μ − PCI of Complete Graphs
1 Interface 2 Interfaces 3 Interfaces 4 Interfaces 5 Interfaces
AES 10 8 0 40 110
Steiner 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.21: Connectiveness of Complete Graphs
Tables 4.20 and 4.21 show that despite the relaxed adjacency matrix, the generated
networks remain sparse. Comparing the table information to the Figure 4.13, the sparsity
of the generated networks explains the lack of diﬀerences between generations. However,
examining the number of active edges present in all generations decreased from the
networks generated from the sparse adjacency matrixes. This means that while the
calculated diﬀerences are small, the original goal is still partially achieved. The number of
edges active 100% of the time over a group of generations is perhaps a better
measurement of network diﬀerences; however, further experiments are required.
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The Steiner method continues to perform better than the AES method, however. At a
95% confidence level, the Steiner method generated networks with greater diﬀerences
than the AES method across all interfaces.
Both methods are compared against Compton’s work in regards to network
diﬀerences for the 5, 10, and 15 node cases at the 1, 2, 3, and 4 interface level as well as
the 30 node case at the 1 and 2 interface level. In both methods, no significant diﬀerences
are observed in the diﬀerences between generated network topologies at the 90%
confidence level using a t-test [1].
4.4 Summary
The results presented here detail the eﬀectiveness of the AES and Steiner methods
with Fleisher’s routing method. The results show that topographic diﬀerences are
dependent on the network infrastructure; the more options a node has to connect to the
network, the greater the amount of diﬀerences can be made. Additionally, the greater the
amount of redundancy, the easier it becomes for network administrators to make changes
without network downtime.
The overall speed of the Steiner method allows for quick changes in the face of an
active attack. This is important because attacks such as distributed denial of service
attacks ramp up quickly. The ability to modify the network configuration as well as block
the appropriate incoming address may serve to continue to allow legitimate traﬃc while
the attack is ongoing. Not only would the attackers have to modify the incoming
addresses, they would have to take the time to modify the attack vector to account for the
shifting topology.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
Demand for eﬀective network defense capabilities continues to increase as cyber
attacks occur more and more frequently and gain more and more prominence in the
media. Many defense strategies exist, but more are needed to meet the challenge of
increasingly sophisticated attacks. This research addresses dynamic network topologies as
a means of network defense in response to both ongoing cyber attacks or the threat of
potential cyber attacks. The prototype application developed dynamically shifts the
network topology and re-routes network traﬃc accordingly. This network shift, in theory,
expends the resources of an attacker, as the network requires continually re-scanning to
determine appropriate attack vectors.
The goal of this research is to provide another layer of defense for use by network
administrators. An algorithm was successfully developed using two diﬀerent
methodologies. The first methodology utilized the Advanced Encryption Standard as a
means to encrypt a network topology. The second methodology uses graph theory and
Steiner trees to generate a network configuration from the basic network information.
Both methods use the Fleisher routing algorithm to ensure the network traﬃc is routed
properly through the new network configuration.
This research improved on previous research by addressing a greater number of
nodes and network commodities. The results for networks with nodes 50, 100, and 1000
have not been addressed previously, and the number of commodities was previously
limited to 3 commodities per network. The sample networks used in this research are
closer in scale and scope to operational networks currently in use.
However, improvements can be made to this research before it is used in operational
environments. Additional steps can be added to the algorithm to group nodes together for
networks larger than 1000 nodes. This would also assist in modifying an extensive
enterprise network such as the DoD’s networks. Each base or other installation would
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have the ability to modify the local network without aﬀecting the connections between
installations. Enterprise administrators can then independently modify those connections.
This scales in the opposite way as well – an installation can independently modify the
networks of various tenants, then on the structure of the greater installation infrastructure.
The scalability allows for isolation of the changes, if required; it is needless to potentially
disturb the entire network when only a certain location is targeted.
The algorithm itself can be improved in a number of ways. The execution runtime
can be shortened if the algorithm were to execute in a parallel manner, instead of in a
serialized way. Currently, both phases and methods of the algorithm execute iteratively,
but each step is not dependent on the surrounding steps. The only dependency is that the
network edges must be modified before the network routing takes place. Additionally, this
algorithm focuses mainly on network infrastructure devices with multiple network
interfaces. General workstations only possess one connection to a single infrastructure
device. While this case can be addressed via the set of possible edges, separation of the
infrastructure devices and workstations may produce better results.
This research also assumed the network edges are bi-directional. In an operational
sense, this is not always a safe assumption. Read-only connections are occasionally
required for security of other purposes. Additionally, measures to weight the network
paths in the route phase of the algorithm can be improved upon. Currently, no preference
is given to routes that were not used in previous generations, if the same edges are still
present. Additional topographical diﬀerences can be achieved with various routing paths.
Network traﬃc demands can also be prioritized; it may be more important to guarantee
e-mail and message traﬃc flow before streaming video, depending on the needs of the
network and the mission.
The work presented here also assumes that the network is clean; that is, there is no
malware present on the network. Potentially, malware already operating on the network
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can automatically adapt to any network changes made by way of sending updated
information back to the attacker. Examination of packets after network modifications may
serve to identify infected machines. This functionality would jointly serve with an IPS as
an enhancement to the IPS network sensors.
Adding security measures to the physical layer of the network adds to the overall
security package of a network. Current security practices stop after data encryption and
network address filtering. Security at the lowest level of network infrastructure allows for
greater control of how the network traﬃc flows around the network. Greater control over
the network means more options are available for defense when the network is attacked.
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